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Teaching Moral Analysis in Law School
Paul G. Haskell*
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to suggest the importance and
feasibility of applying moral principles to legal problems in law
school instruction. My legal education at Harvard some forty years
ago did not include the moral analysis of law, and there is little
of it in legal education today. Indeed, it is safe to say that from
Langdell to the present, legal education has never seriously at-
tempted to incorporate moral principles into instruction. There
are at least two reasons for this. One reason is, that some legal
educators do not believe morality warrants serious consideration
because it is thought to be indeterminate, relative, subjective or
religious, or a construct to justify private interests. The other rea-
son is that those legal educators who believe that morality has
value do not consider themselves sufficiently educated in the sub-
ject to include it in their instruction. This Article is not likely to
convince the unconvinced of the value of morality. I am more
sanguine, however, about the possibility of demystifying morality
for those who already acknowledge its value. There is difficulty in
dealing with the concept, but the difficulty is not insurmountable.
I received a research leave for the 1990 spring semester to
do reading in the area of moral philosophy. The concept of mo-
rality has intrigued me for many years, but I have always felt
inadequately informed about its origins, what its content is, and
how one deals with the recurring conflicts of moral obligations.
After several months of reading, I have acquired a rudimentary
understanding of its content and its method of resolving conflicts.
The source of the sense of moral "right" and "wrong," of moral
duty, which most people possess in Western culture, and probably
in most cultures, remains a mystery and need not be resolved for
present purposes. It suffices that the sense of "right" and
"wrong," of moral duty, is a psychological fact. Aesthetic apprecia-
tion is a mystery of a similar kind. The sense of the moral -and
* Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
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the sense of the aesthetic have in common that they make life
worth living and are unintelligible to the logical positivist.
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE LAW SCHOOL CLASSROOM
The legal instruction to which I was subjected took essentially
the following form. The facts of a conflict were examined and a
remedial resolution or the absence thereof would be determined
and expressed in a generalization applicable to all conflicts of that
specific nature. Next, the same facts, modified in some respect,
would be considered, followed by a determination of whether the
same resolution was appropriate, or whether a different resolution
was appropriate stated in the form of a somewhat different gener-
alization. These resolutions, these legal conclusions, would be
justified in terms of "logic," "fairness," 'justice," "common sense,"
or "public policy." Fairness and justice are moral terms, but usual-
ly no effort was made to probe their meaning, or even to explain
that it was morality that was involved. Public policy connotes so-
cial benefit or utility; sometimes this would be examined in more
detail. Common sense denotes self-evidence. Logic in this context
could be deductive (analogical) or inductive. Forty years ago legal
realism was not in vogue at Harvard, and it is my impression that
this was generally true in legal education, Yale being clearly an
exception. That is to say, discretion and choice in the determina-
tion of facts and applicable law were not discussed in any juris-
prudential sense. The jurisprudence seemed to be conceptualism
(formalism) tempered with gradual socioeconomic change and
homespun morality. Classroom analysis primarily focused on the
merits of legal conclusions; I do not recall that the instruction
focused significantly on the advocate's use of the law. This de-
scription is obviously a grossly simplified statement of how law
was taught many years ago, but it captures the essence of legal
education.
Legal education has changed in several respects. Legal real-
ism, i.e., judicial discretion and choice, is standard fare, although
the extreme realist position is probably not as broadly accepted
today as it was a couple of decades ago. Some professors feel
sufficiently comfortable with economic efficiency analysis to use it
where it fits, either descriptively or prescriptively. Clearly, moral
analysis is absent today as it was forty years ago, except insofar as
the words "fair" and 'just" are used to support results.
Today, law students are frequently taught that the practitio-
ner can manipulate facts and legal rules in the interest of the
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client's objective, and that the court can consciously or subcon-
sciously manipulate facts and legal rules in the interest of the
judge's social, economic, or other preferences. Indeed, law teach-
ers deem it desirable for the courts to use their discretionary
powers to maximize economic efficiency, maximize economic free-
dom, minimize economic inequality, protect the environment,
assist the poor, compensate victims of discrimination, and so on,
in accordance with the instructor's social concerns and preferenc-
es. The law is perceived today, at least among many academics, as
a more malleable institution of social control than it was several
decades ago. This change in the perception of law has great mor-
al implications, but it is seldom, if ever, analyzed in those terms.
In a provocative article, Professor Roger Cramton of Cornell
deplored the "ordinary religion of the American law school class-
room," which consists of "a skeptical attitude toward generaliza-
tions; an instrumental approach to law and lawyering; a 'tough-
minded' and analytical attitude toward legal tasks and professional
roles; and a faith that man, by the application of his reason and
the use of democratic processes, can make the world a better
place."' Law teachers stress "cognitive rationality along with
'hard' facts and 'cold' logic and 'concrete' realities. Emotion,
imagination, sentiments of affection and trust, a sense of wonder
or awe at the inexplicable-these soft and mushy domains of the
'tender minded' are off limits ....
Cramton described the models of the "hired gun" and the
"social engineer" which are presented to law students:
The former is the skilled craftsman of the discrete controversy,
while the latter is the technician and applied scientist of the
use of legal tools for broader social change. Both are techni-
cians who are trained in the dispassionate use of legal skills
for the instrumental purposes of those they serve. The hired
gun gets his goals from the client he serves; the social engi-
neer either prefabricates his own goals or gets them from the
interests he serves. Involvement in the messy reality of human
feelings is to be avoided by both in favor of an analytical de-
tachment that gives preeminence to a rational calculation of
alternative strategies of.aggressive action.
3
1 Cramton, The Ordinay Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC.
247, 248 (1978).
2 Id. at 250.
3 I& at 251.
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Cramton asked: "Are law students encouraged to be indiffer-
ent to character, insensitive to human problems, lacking in human
concerns? Are they educated in accordance with an unreal profes-
sional model of detachment, non-involvement, and insensitivity?"4
Cramton's comments are aimed at a good deal more than the
absence of moral analysis of the law or the lawyer's role, but that
is unquestionably one of his concerns.
Although realism and economic analysis have become the
new jurisprudential elements of legal instruction in recent de-
cades, my impression is that in many classrooms law continues to
be taught, as in decades past, substantially in an objective, concep-
tualistic fashion, tempered with socioeconomic commentary. Many
faculty do not understand economic efficiency analysis, or to the
extent that they do, they are unconvinced by it. Some faculty are
not convinced of the truth of the realist premise of easy manipu-
lability of law. In classrooms where there has been change, and in
classrooms where there has not, moral analysis does not play a
significant role.
II. WHY MORAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL RESULTS IS IMPORTANT
I wish to make it clear that there is one issue in the relation-
ship of morality to law with which I am not concerned. I am
uninterested in the tired question of whether a grossly immoral
rule emanating from the sovereign is truly a law. I accept that it
is, and that a morally responsible person may or must decline to
obey it. I fail to understand why it is important what label is
placed on the sovereign's immoral act so long as it is understood
that there are values which transcend obedience to the sovereign.
There are several reasons for subjecting legal results to moral
analysis. First of all, moral analysis assists in the explanation and
prediction of legal conclusions. The law is eclectic; there is no
unitary theory of law. Conceptualism, realism, criticalism, econom-
ic analysis, behavioral analysis, gender analysis, moral analysis,
among other theories, all play roles in the development of law.
Law is made by people, and people are multi-faceted. There is a
naive streak among academics which seems to require a unitary
explanation of legal phenomena. If one factor explains all, then
truth is at hand. If many factors are involved, then there is inde-
terminacy and the truth is elusive. The academic feels defeated by
4 Id. at 261.
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the inability to explain all. She is then no better than the nonaca-
demic who also cannot explain all (and does not try to).
Morality plays a role; I suspect that it plays a greater role
than most legal academics give it credit for. Even positivists such
as Holmes5 and Hart6 recognized that law is rooted in morality.
Our law is made by individuals conditioned by the Western moral
tradition, 'which draws upon Judeo-Christian values. Law as the
principal means of governing relationships inevitably has substan-
tial moral content.
Another reason for moral analysis is that the viability of our
system of freedom under law is ultimately dependent upon the
belief of the governed that the law, however flawed, is fundamen-
tally fair and right. Freedom under law requires the consent- of
the governed that they will not violate the property or person of
others, that they will respect the intellectual and spiritual freedom
of others, that they will honor their obligations, and that they will
abide by the rule of the majority so long as it does not deny
these rights and duties. It is consent, not the force of the state,
that makes freedom possible. That consent derives from a belief
that the system is fundamentally fair and right, whatever its short-
comings. If the moral basis for consent becomes eroded, freedom
under law is jeopardized. If the system is no longer perceived as
moral, an intrusive system of governance is likely to replace it.
Richard John Neuhaus, a theologian who has written exten-
sively on the relationship of morality and law, expressed this idea
as follows:
Whatever else law may be, it- is a human enterprise in re-
sponse to human behavior, and human behavior is stubbornly
entangled with beliefs alout right and wrong. Law that is rec-
ognized as legitimate is therefore related to ... the larger
universe of moral discourse that helps shape human behavior.
In short, if law is not also. a moral enterprise, it is without
legitimacy or binding force.'
Another reas6n for moral analysis of law is concern for the
character of the potential lawyers in training. If the moral content
of law is de-emphasized in legal education, the student may be-
come less conscious of moral constraints in her practice. The
5 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L REV. 457, 459 (1897). This also ap-
pears in 0. HoLMEs, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 170 (1920).
6 H. HART, LAw, LIBERTY, AND MORA=Ln 1 (1963).
7 Neuhaus, Law and the Rightness of Things, 14 VAL. U.L REV. 1, 8 (1979).
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moral content of law and the morality of law practice are separate
subjects, but it stands to reason that each has an affect upon the
other. The lawyer's awareness of the moral content of law may
enhance the awareness of the moral constraints upon the lawyer.
If one considers that one is engaged in a moral enterprise, one
may be more likely to conduct oneself in a moral manner.
8
III. THE BASIC COMPONENTS OF MORALITY
The British moral philosopher, G.F. Warnock, in his thought-
ful book, The Object of Morality, describes the role of morality:
[T]he general object of moral evaluation must be to contribute
in some respects, by way of the actions of rational beings, to
the amelioration of the human predicament-that is, of the
conditions in which these rational beings, humans, actually find
themselves. Accordingly, I take it to be necessary to under-
standing in this case to consider, first, what it is in the human
predicament that calls for amelioration, and second, what
might reasonably be suggested (to put it guardedly) as the
specific contribution of 'morality' to such amelioration ....
[T]he 'general object' of morality, appreciation of
which may enable us to understand the basis of moral evalua-
tion, is to contribute to betterment-or non-deterioration-of
the human predicament, primarily and essentially by seeking to
countervail 'limited sympathies' and their potentially most dam-
aging effects. It is the proper business of morality, and the
general object of moral evaluation, not of course to add to our
available resources, nor-directly anyway-to our knowledge of
how to make advantageous, use of them, nor-again, not direct-
ly-to make us more rational in the judicious pursuit of our
interests and ends; its proper business is to expand our sympa-
thies, or, better, to reduce the liability to damage inherent in
their natural tendency to be narrowly restricted.'
Warnock states that our "limited sympathies" for others cause
us to harm, deceive, discriminate against, and avoid helping oth-
ers. He then posits the basic moral principles of nonmaleficence,
beneficence, fairness, and nondeception. Nonmaleficence is the
avoidance of doing harm; beneficence is the doing of good; fair-
ness is nondiscrimination, the doing of justice; nondeception is
8 See Bennett, Making Moral Lawyers: A Modest Proposal, 36 CATH. U.L REv. 45
(1986).
9 G. WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF MoRALrrY 16, 26 (1971).
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the avoidance of lying, breaking promises, and the like.10
The prominent British philosopher, W.D. Ross, in his noted
book, The Right and the Good, enumerated several basic moral du-
ties in the following paraphrased form: (1) Duty of fidelity
(keeping promises and not telling lies); (2) duty of beneficence
(doing good for others); (3) duty of nonmaleficence (not doing
harm to others); (4) duty of justice (avoiding the distribution of
pleasure or happiness which is not in accordance with the merit
of the person benefitted or deprived); (5) duty to oneself to im-
prove one's virtue or intelligence; (6) duty of reparation (compen-
sating for wrongful acts); (7) duty of gratitude for services done
by others.
1'
The first four correspond to the principles Warnock de-
scribed. The moral duty to oneself is recognized by some philoso-
phers and not by others.12 The duties of reparation and grat-
itude are not usually included in the category of basic moral du-
ties. Reparation seems to be subsumed under nonmaleficence;
gratitude seems to be a state of mind rather than a duty of con-
duct.
The American moral philosopher, William K. Frankena, also
recognizes the basic moral duties of doing good for others, not
inflicting harm upon others, being truthful, keeping promises, and
doing justice (treating individuals in similar circumstances in a
similar manner)."3 Frankena, however, equivocates on the exis-
tence of a duty to oneself to develop one's capacities and not to
harm oneself.1
4
The American philosopher, John Rawls, in his lengthy and
difficult book, A Theory of Justice, speaks of the duty to help oth-
ers, the duty to avoid doing harm, and the duty of fidelity, which
is concerned with keeping promises. 5 Although it is not stated
explicitly, presumably lying would constitute a form of harm or a
breach of fidelity. Rawls' tome is, of course, concerned primarily
with justice, which he defines generally as fairness, and in particu-
lar he defines in two parts as follows: (1) Each person is to have
10 Id. at 80-87.
11 W. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 21 (1930).
12 See A. DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY 76 (1977).
13 See W. FRANKENA, ETHICs 43-55 (2d. ed. 1973).
14 Id. at 54-55. Frankena posits that although it is logical that moral principles
should apply to oneself as well as to others, it may not be necessary to think in terms
of duty to oneself because individuals naturally care for and protect themselves.
15 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 113, 346 (1971).
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an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty which is compat-
ible with a similar liberty for others; and (2) social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to po-
sitions and offices open to all. 6
There is clearly a consensus among modern moral philoso-
phers concerning the fundamental components of morality: avoid-
ing harm, helping others, keeping promises, not lying, and giving
each what he is due (justice).'7
At the center of the concept of morality is the dignity, the
value, the freedom, the self-determination, of the human being.
The human being is not to be harmed or lied to or discriminated
against, and the promises that are made to a human being are to
be kept. If these duties are performed by others including the
state, the individual will be free and self-determining and have
dignity. If morality imposes such duties, it follows that the indi-
vidual has the moral right to freedom, self-determination, and
dignity. Morality is the recognition of the intrinsic worth of the
human being.
Where does the notion of the intrinsic worth of the human
being come from? It cannot be demonstrated empirically or logi-
cally that your or I are intrinsically valuable. Hitler, Stalin, and
Pol Pot didn't believe that each person was intrinsically valuable.
Can it be proved that they were wrong? The moral philosophers
have no convincing answer. Sometimes it is said that man has
intrinsic value because he is rational. 8 Why is this so? Reason
enables man to dominate the earth and contemplate his existence,
but how does that establish his intrinsic worth? Can values be de-
rived from fact? To the Judeo-Christian theist, man has worth
because God said so-but that is faith, not reason. The secular
moral philosopher also accepts man's intrinsic value on
faith-secular faith. This is, of course, my inference, not the ex-
plicit position of the secular philosophers.
19
It should be noted that the utilitarian moralist does not be-
16 Id. at 83.
17 See A. DONAGAN, supra note 12, at 76-100; B. GERT, MORALITY 96-159 (1988); A.
QUINTON, UTILITARIAN ETmIcs 69 (1973); P. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT 38
(1974). See also S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 76 (1978).
18 See discussion in A. DONAGAN, supra note 12, at 63-65, 71-82, 228-34.
19 It has been said that a major achievement of the Enlightenment was to express
religious positions in secular terms. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical?, 36
STAN. L REV. 247, 289 (1984).
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lieve in the intrinsic worth of the human being. Morality to the
utilitarian consists of achieving the greatest possible balance of
pleasure or happiness over pain, or the greatest net utility for
society, however one defines pleasure, happiness, pain, or utility.
It is arithmetical, and in its calculus the interests (or lives) of a
few may be sacrificed for the benefit of a greater number. The
individual human being is not a unique moral consideration.
Most modern moral philosophers are not utilitarian in the
strict sense. Most accept the intrinsic value of the human being.
The moral constraints enumerated above are not accepted strictly
on the basis that they produce the greatest net utility in any given
situation. While the constraints are socially useful, their signifi-
cance transcends the utilitarian calculus. The utilitarian would find
lying acceptable if the benefit from the lie was greater than the
damage produced by the lie. The nonutilitarian moralist would
also permit lying in certain circumstances, but the justification
would require greater significance than the arithmetical balance of
social utility. The duty to tell the truth would have weight in the
decisional scales which would not be limited to its utility. John
Rawls is not a utilitarian, but he emphasized that consequences
are important: "All ethical doctrines worth our attention take con-
sequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not
would simply be irrational, crazy."2°
What do the. philosophers consider to be the basis for the
moral duties? Reference has been made to respect for man as a
rational being. W.D. Ross, an intuitionist,* asserted that the duties
are self-evident.21 Most, however, do not explain precisely what
the basis is. Clearly they are all concerned with the social utility
of the duties, although most are not utilitarian in the pure sense.
They recognize that the moral duties have a force which is more
than a matter of utility, but the element other than utility is not
defined. That element seems to' be intuitional in some sense of
the word. Rawls describes the situation:
We sometimes forget that the great utilitarians, Hume and
Adam Smith, Bentham and Mill, were social theorists and
economists of the first rank; and the moral doctrine they,
worked out was framed to meet the need of their wider inter-
ests and to fit into a comprehensive scheme. Those who criti-
cized them often did so on a much narrower front. They
20 J. RAWLS, supra note 15, at 30.
21 W. Ross, supra note 11, at 29.
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pointed out the obscurities of the principles of utility and not-
ed the apparent incongruities between many of its implications
and our moral sentiments. But they failed, I believe, to con-
struct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose
it. The outcome is that we often seem forced to choose be-
tween utilitarianism and intuitionism. Most likely we finally
settle upon a variant of the utility principle circumscribed and
restricted in certain ad hoc ways by intuitionistic constraints.2
The basic moral duties have been set forth in very general
form, and at this point some elaboration is called for. Harm is
any injury to or interference with the freedom, person, property,
or interests of an individual which is not justified in the circum-
stances. It is morally permissible to injure or even kill another in
self-defense. It is morally permissible for the state to restrict one's
use of land to further a societal objective. On the other hand,
except in unusual circumstances, it is not morally permissible to
perform surgery upon a competent adult without first obtaining
her consent and informing her of the alternatives and the risks.
One has a duty to do good to others "provided that one can
do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself."2 3 This qualifica-
tion follows from the fact that one has a duty to care for oneself.
I am as morally valuable as you. I am therefore not obligated to
deprive myself in order to provide for you, although I have a
duty to provide for you if it does not result in a substantial depri-
vation to myself. Doing good to others in excess of such an ob-
ligation is, of course, considered to be a highly moral act, but it
is not a moral duty; such saintly conduct is referred to as super-
erogatory.
24
The duty of truthfulness includes more than intentional mis-
representation. The duty forbids deception. Silence or conduct
intended to deceive violates the duty. There may be circumstanc-
es, however, in which misrepresentation is morally permissible, or
even obligatory. If A asks me where B is, and I have good reason
to believe that A intends to harm B physically, my untruthful an-
swer to A is morally permissible or obligatory. There are circum-
stances in which a physician may be justified in lying about a
discouraging prognosis to a psychologically fragile patient, or a
parent may be justified in lying to a young child in order to reas-
22 J. RAWLS, supra note 15, at vii-viii.
23 Id. at 114.
24 See A. DONAGAN, supra note 12, at 86.
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sure the child. Similar reasoning may justify the failure to keep a
promise.
The duty of justice, i.e., giving each what he is entitled to,
and treating individuals in similar circumstances in a similar man-
ner, is a vast subject. It involves the need to justify differential
treatment of individuals, whether it is the distribution of goods,
jobs, education, or medical services that is involved, or the regula-
tion of conduct. The formal principles, as just stated, are simple
enough. The substance, however, can be complex and varies with
societal values. The classical liberal ideal of equality of opportuni-
ty and distribution based on performance without significant state
involvement is different from the welfare-state emphasis upon
distribution based on need. Rawls' position is that inequalities are
justified only if they benefit all. Criminal justice, of course, calls
for equality of treatment under the criminal law; what is also im-
portant from the standpoint of justice is the substance of the
criminal laws. That is to say, injustice can consist of immoral laws,
i.e., laws which proscribe certain conduct without adequate justifi-
cation, as well as disparate administration of the laws.
IV. MORAL CONFLICTS
It is one thing to state the generally accepted moral princi-
ples; it is another to determine what constitutes moral conduct
when the principles are in conflict in a specific situation. Several
examples of conflict were briefly described at the conclusion of
Part III. It will become evident that in conflict situations the de-
termination of moral conduct is a blend of intuition and a con-
cern for consequences. Contemporary moral philosophers general-
ly do not accept the moral duties as absolutes; the moral duties
are to be fulfilled presumptively, but circumstances may justify
their breach.2"
Let us first examine a problem concerning deception. Profes-
sor is a law professor. Student is a third-year law student in the
25 See W. FRANKENA, supra note 13, at 55-56; B. GERT, supra note 17, at 271-75, 282-
303; R. HARE, MORAL THINKING 25-64 (1981); D. LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW
81, 84, 106 (1984); W. Ross, supra note 11, at 28-42; J. WALLACE, MORAL RELEVANCE
AND MORAL CONFLICT 78-95 (1988). See generally S. BOK, supra note 17. For essays on
moral conflicts in the bioethics area, see BIOETFHICS (T. Shannon ed. 1987); ETHICAL IS-
SUES IN MODERN MEDICINE (J. Arras & N. Rhoden 3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter ETHICAL
ISSUES]. For an analysis of the morality of the criminal sanction and the balancing pro-
cess involved, see J. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS (1984).
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process of interviewing for a job. He is very personable and inter-
views well. Student was in two of Professor's courses and received
a grade of "B" in both. Student's average places him in the top
quarter of his class. He was frequently absent from Professor's
classes and was unprepared on the several occasions that Profes-
sor called on him. Professor also heard from a colleague that
Student handed in a seminar paper six weeks late without ade-
quate justification. Professor's impression of Student was that he
had not been responsible in the performance of his academic
duties, although he was probably very competent.
Professor received a phone call from Lawyer, a former stu-
dent whom she had not seen for ten years and whom she knew
well when Lawyer was a student. Lawyer said that he was chair-
person of his firm's hiring committee and that his firm (a promi-
nent one in a large city) had interviewed Student and was very
favorably impressed with his academic record and with him as a
person. Lawyer asked if Professor knew Student, and if so, what
her assessment of him was. Professor knew that if she accurately
stated her assessment of Student, however she might qualify it,
Student's chances of receiving an offer would be jeopardized.
Professor told Lawyer that Student was in two of her courses in
which he had received a good grade, but beyond that she had no
other information. Was Professor's response morally justifiable?
The issue, of course, is whether Professor's failure to disclose
what she knew, a form of deception, was justified. She failed to
disclose in order to help Student, or at least not to harm him.
One of the several consequences of lying' is that the listener may
be harmed by his reliance upon what he has been told. That
consequence may apply here. Professor felt, however, that her im-
pression of Student's irresponsibility may have been based upon
inadequate experience with Student. Professor also felt that Stu-
dent might conduct himself responsibly in a job despite his irre-
sponsibility in the law school setting. Professor could have avoid-
ed misrepresentation by stating that she preferred not to com-
ment on Student; this, of course, would have damaging implica-
tions.
If Professor's impression of irresponsibility is accurate,
Lawyer's firm may be harmed by Professor's misrepresentation. If,
on the other hand, Student's conduct was due to immaturity or
his attitude toward law school, and his performance at the firm
turns out to be satisfactory, the misrepresentation would not
harm Student or the firm but rather would benefit both.
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The issue is whether the lie is justified by the good that it
may produce or the *harm that it may avoid. There is a strong
presumption that deception is impermissible. It seems to me that
the purported justification is inadequate. Certainly, a contrary
conclusion is not unreasonable.
Let us examine a problem dealing with promises. Jim was a
bright, young systems analyst employed by Corporation, a large
national enterprise. Corporation offered to Pay Jim's tuition and
living expenses at a leading graduate school of business for the
two years required for an M.B.A. In exchange, Jim would agree to
remain in a management position with Corporation for five years
after he received his degree. Jim accepted the offer, signed the
contract, and started his business school education. During his
first year he met, fell in love with and married Mary, a young law
professor at a nearby law school, an institution of middle-level
status. Within weeks of the marriage Mary received an offer to
visit during the next academic year at one of the leading law
schools in the nation located 500 miles away. She accepted the
offer. During the next academic year they had a commuter mar-
riage, seeing each other most weekends. In the late fall of that
year she was offered a tenure-track position at the leading law
school, which she accepted. Also during that year she became
pregnant, despite their precautions.
Jim had insisted that Mary not accept the tenure-track posi-
tion, but she did anyway. Mary then insisted that Jim move to her
location, find a job there, and help care for the child after it
arrived. Jim protested that he was committed to Corporation
which had no offices near her location. Mary responded that her
job was a once-in-a-lifetime career opportunity, Corporation would
survive without him, and that he owed it to the child to move.
Mary was adamant about the matter. Corporation told Jim that he
was honor-bound to comply with the contract, but that it would
not pursue any legal action. Jim told Corporation 'that he would
repay Corporation over time for the cost of his education. Corpo-
ration responded that it was the services of bright, young people
that it needed.
Jim left Corporation, joined Mary, found a job there, and
shared the responsibility of caring for the child. Was Jim's con-
duct morally acceptable?
Jim broke his promise to Corporation, but was this decision
justified by his duties to Mary and the child? Jim's duty to the
child is not a case of an altruistic doing of good. Jim came under
1991]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
obligation to the child because he fathered the child. Jim's rela-
tionship with Mary implied an undertaking to be responsible to
any child resulting from their relationship. This obligation seems
to fall within the category of fidelity. Whatever label is attached
to the duty, it clearly exists. Mary's obstinacy made it impossible
for him to care for, the child and stay with Corporation.
Jim also had a duty to Mary to maintain the marriage. The
fact that Mary placed her career above Jim's promise to Corpora-
tion does not necessarily relieve Jim of his duty to keep the mar-
riage intact. This duty also seems t6 come under the heading of
fidelity. There is also the pragmatic consideration that Mary's
career opportunity is critical to her, whereas Jim's employment by
Corporation is of minor significance to Corporation when viewed
in isolation. There is, of course, the damage that is done to the
relationship of trust between Corporation and employees like Jim
when an event of this nature occurs.
It is my conclusion that despite the strong presumption that
promises should be kept, Jim's conduct is justifiable. The moral
duty to Corporation is outweighed by Jim's moral duty to the
child and to maintain the marriage. Once again, others may dis-
agree. Morality consists of values; values are not empirically or
logically provable.
The controversial question of racial affirmative action pres-
ents a moral conflict concerning justice. In order to maintain a
certain percentage of black middle-management employees, Em-
ployer has a policy of preferring black applicants over white appli-
cants whose credentials, by customary standards of management,
are superior to those of the black applicants, whenever that is
necessary. It is assumed that this practice is not illegal under state
or federal law. On its face, this is unjust to the white applicant
because she is being treated differently from the black applicant
on the basis of a factor which has no relationship to the qualifica-
tions for the job. One justification for the use of race as a criteri-
on is that given this country's history of slavery, segregation, and
discrimination, American society has a duty to compensate the
black minority by accelerating its participation in the nation's
economy. There is also the argument that discrimination against
blacks in employment will continue unless goals and quotas for
them are used. In addition, blacks in management positions serve
as role models for young blacks who might not otherwise consid-
er that there was opportunity for them in those positions, in view
of the history of discrimination.
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In addition to the injustice to the white applicant, there are
other arguments against preferential hiring of blacks with lesser
credentials. One argument is that this practice causes many in
society of both races to assume that blacks generally are
underqualified for their jobs; this attitude is damaging to blacks
who have obtained their positions independently of affirmative
action considerations. There is also the argument that preferential
hiring policies place blacks in positions in which they may per-
form less well than their white counterparts, thereby perpetuating
racially prejudiced attitudes. Finally, there is the contention that
social divisiveness results from disparate treatment based on race.
Obviously, reasonable people may differ on whether preferen-
tial hiring is morally justifiable. It is a close call, but it is my con-
clusion that the strong presumption against the injustice of using
a racial criterion is not overcome by the arguments in support of
preferential hiring.
Finally, let us examine briefly the duty to help others so long
as the burden upon or risk to oneself is not excessive. One has a
duty to make reasonable contributions to responsibly operated
charities, but one is not required to give his life savings to the
starving people of Ethiopia. One has a duty to help a sick neigh-
bor by taking him to the doctor, preparing meals, and the like,
but one is not obligated to give up one's job to care for him on
a daily basis. If one does give up all to help others, it is highly
moral conduct, but it is not considered obligatory.
Let us look at the problem of rescue in the context of doing
good. Stan is twenty-five, single, and a former member of his col-
lege swimming team. He is walking along a deserted beach on the
Outer Banks of North Carolina where the surf is menacing and
riptides are common. Stan has never had any life-saving instruc-
tion. Suddenly he sees a person struggling in the surf 150 feet
from shore. The swimmer, a woman, raises an arm when she can
to signal that she is in trouble, and she appears to be caught in a
riptide pulling her away from shore. She is being slammed by
each wave and disappears under the surface for a moment and
then reappears. Stan's reaction is that his chance of saving the
woman if he attempts it are not better than fifty percent, and the
risk of his drowning in the process would not be insubstantial.
Stan does not attempt to rescue the woman who shortly thereaf-
ter drowns in the surf. It seems that Stan has not violated the
moral duty to do good. He was entitled to care for himself which
justified the failure to help another.
1991] 1039
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
V. MORAL ANALYSIS OF LAW
Let us first examine a case in which Physician is asked by the
suffering Patient to assist in causing his immediate painless death,
a form of euthanasia. 6 Patient, at the age of seventy, had been
operated on for cancer. Following the operation he received radi-
ation and chemotherapy. The cancer has reappeared, and he con-
tinues to undergo the same treatment. He is in constant discom-
fort and frequent pain. Physician has advised him that the treat-
ment may arrest the cancer, but the odds are strongly against it.
There is a substantial likelihood that he will die within a year.
Patient was a newspaper columnist until the onset of the cancer;
he had to give up his work because he could no longer produce
his column regularly. He has tried to write a book on a political
subject, but has made little progress because of his illness. Patient
does not wish to go on living. His wife is sympathetic with his
position, as are his children. Patient asks Physician if she will
assist him to end his life immediately without pain. Suicide is not
a crime in the state, but aiding a person to end his life would be
a criminal act.
Let us first examine the morality of Patient's action. This
involves a conflict between the moral value of autonomy on the
one hand, and the duty to self on the other. Obviously, one's
autonomy does not entitle one to violate the moral rights of an-
other. By analogy, one's autonomy should not entitle one to vio-
late one's duty to oneself. The duty to self requires that one de-
velop one's capacities and preserve oneself. The issue is whether
the duty to self is outweighed by the discomfort, pain, inability to
be productive, and the imminence of death. It is reasonable to
conclude that terminating one's life in this circumstance is a mor-
al exercise of one's autonomy, although, of course, some may dis-
agree.
Assuming Patient's suicide is morally permissible, is Physician
morally permitted to assist him by providing a lethal injection or
other painless means? If one disregards state law, it seems that
assisting Patient to do what he is morally permitted to do is itself
morally permissible. However, state law has a role to play in the
determination of the morality of Physician's conduct.
Why is euthanasia a crime? The reason probably is rooted in
26 See ETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 25, at 220-50, for essays on euthanasia.
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the Western religious tradition which considers that only God is
permitted to take life. There are, of course, exceptions in this
tradition, such as self-defense, just war, and capital punishment.
Taking life in this circumstance is not an exception. There is also
the functional explanation that it is better to prohibit absolutely
the taking of life in this context than to open the door to discre-
tion that may be abused or mistaken. Better to ban justifiable
euthanasia than to run the risk that some lives Will be taken that
should not have been. The law as applied to euthanasia can be
defended as moral even though it may function to block morally
permissible action in individual instances.
If Physician assists Patient to terminate his life, she commits a
major crime. It is accepted that if the system of government is
fundamentally just, however flawed it may be, there is a moral
duty to comply with its laws. It is also recognized that even in a
basically just system, an individual law may be so immoral that it
is permissible or possibly obligatory not to comply with it. It is
also possible that in such a system there are special circumstances
in which it is permissible or obligatory not to comply with a mor-
al law.
The duty generally to obey the law in a just system seems to
fall under the heading of fidelity; by accepting the benefits of
such a system, one becomes obligated to abide by its rules.
27 If
one were free to violate the laws in a just system on less than
very compelling grounds, the viability of the just system would be
jeopardized.
The issue is, then, whether Physician would be morally justi-
fied to violate the law in order to assist Patient. I think not. The
euthanasia circumstance does not seem to be a sufficient justifica-
tion for the violation of law. Obviously there is room for disagree-
ment.
Now a problem dealing with the pedestrian subject of the
statute of limitations. Developer entered into a written contract
with Contractor for th'e construction of an office building on land
owned by Developer. Shortly before construction was to begin
Contractor decided to enter another line of business and notified
Developer that he wasn't going to perform. Developer was upset,
told Contractor he would hold him liable for this breach, and
27 For a discussion of this issue, including essays by John Rawls, Milton Konvitz,
John Courtney Murray, Sidney Hook, and others, see LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3-101 (S.
Hook ed. 1964).
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made other arrangements. Developer clearly has a contract action
against Contractor. From time to time they discussed a settlement
but never agreed on a figure. Negotiations broke down, time
passed, and finally Developer contacted an attorney to bring suit.
There was a three-year statute of limitations on contract claims;
by the time Developer contacted an attorney three years and one
month had elapsed from the time Contractor was to have begun
construction. The attorney brought suit hoping that she could
convince the trial judge to apply a theory akin to estoppel to
defer the running of the statute because of the negotiations. In
his pleadings Contractor admitted the validity of the contract and
his breach, and pleaded the statute of limitations. The trial judge
ruled in favor Contractor.
There are several moral issues to be examined. First, the mo-
rality of Contractor's use of the statute of limitations. Second, the
morality of the statute itself. Third, the morality of Contractor's
attorney in establishing a defense based on the statute. Fourth,
the morality of the trial judge's participation in the resolution of
the litigation.
There is little question that Contractor's use of the statute of
limitations to avoid paying a claim based on his willful breach of
contract is an immoral act. The refusal to compensate for the
failure to keep one's promise is a continuation of the first immor-
al act. The fact that the law permits it does not make the conduct
moral. There is much conduct permitted by law that is immoral.
Contractor had the choice of paying the claim, as adjudicated by
the court, or avoiding it by legal means, and he chose the latter.
Can a law be moral which can be used to achieve an immor-
al objective? The first amendment is just such a law. One can
preach hatred of a racial or religious group, and indeed advocate
genocide, with impunity. The statute of limitations is also such a
law. The best reason for the statute is the protection it provides
to the defendant who is not, or may not be, liable, but has diffi-
culty establishing his defense because of the passage of time. His
witnesses have forgotten, moved, or died, or his evidence is other-
wise unavailable or difficult to obtain years after the event. There
are also other considerations which justify the statute. Everyone
shares an interest in resolving disputes soon after they occur so
that people can go on with their affairs. A person who has a valid
claim of a substantial nature usually brings suit without unusual
delay. Everyone is on notice that delay will be penalized. These
considerations outweigh the fact that bad people on occasion will
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gain a wrongful advantage over people who are merely dilatory.
The statute works unjustified harm sometimes, but on balance it
is desirable to have a statute which establishes a deadline for
bringing suit.
Then there is the issue of the participation of the lawyer in
the accomplishment of the Contractor's immoral objective. The
lawyer is not obligated to accept the case, but once she does,
under the rules governing the profession she becomes committed
to do what is necessary and lawful to accomplish the client's ob-
jective, without regard to moral or social consequences. Zealous
and exclusive dedication to the client's interest within the law is
the essence of the lawyer's role. Is it morally permissible for the
lawyer to assist in the achievement of the client's immoral objec-
tive? Are the rules which govern the profession morally defensible
in this respect? The moral philosophers disagree.
The position that the lawyer's conduct is morally defensible
emphasizes the roles that are performed in the legal system and
the autonomy of the client-citizen within the system. Legislators
and judges have been granted the authority to determine what is
legal and what is not, and the system of laws under which we live
is fundamentally just, however flawed it may be. The citizen is
entitled to know what he lawfully can and cannot do. The lawyer
is the person to advise on such matters. If those who make the
laws permit the citizen to do what is immoral, it is his legal right
to do it. If it is his legal right to do it, he is entitled to the assis-
tance of the lawyer to achieve it. If the lawyer declines to assist
the citizen, the lawyer denies the citizen an aspect of his autono-
my as a citizen. The participation of the lawyer in the immoral
conduct of the client is justified by the fundamental rightness of
the system and the differentiation of roles and responsibilities
within that system.2"
The moral philosophers who conclude that the amorality and
unaccountability of lawyers is not defensible approach the issue
differently. The lawyer who assists the client to achieve an immor-
al objective is directly engaged in immoral conduct. There is a
duty to refrain from such conduct unless such conduct can be
justified on other grounds of morality or social utility. The moral
principle of the autonomy of the client does not extend to the
28 See generally Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of The Lauyer-Cli-
ent Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Pepper, The Lawyers Amoral Ethical Role: A De-
fense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 613.
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invasion of the moral rights of others. The law may permit the
client to do immoral acts, but that has no effect upon the immo-
rality of the conduct. If the lawyer feels morally bound not to act,
the client can undoubtedly find another lawyer who will not con-
sider the conduct so offensive that she cannot bring herself to
represent the client. If all available lawyers agree upon the im-
morality of the client's objective, and decline representation on
that ground, the conduct is probably so vile that he should not
be represented. The basically good system will not be damaged in
any way by the unavailability of representation in this circum-
stance.
29
It should be noted that some of the moral philosophers who
oppose the amoral role of the lawyer are inclined to make an
exception for criminal defense, for reasons that are beyond the
scope of this discussion.
0
What about the judge's participation in the immorality by her
ruling in favor of Contractor after he pleads the statute of limita-
tions? Certainly the judge assists in the achievement of the im-
moral objective. Her immoral conduct can certainly be justified.
The legal system requires that the judge apply immoral laws, and
moral laws which produce immorality in a specific circumstance.
The judge has committed herself, has promised, to apply the law.
If the judge chooses not to apply the law on moral grounds, she
becomes a legislator. The consequences would be chaotic. The
role of the judge requires that she act. The roles of the client and
lawyer do not require them to engage in immorality. The judge
has the immorality placed before her, and she cannot avoid it."1
There is an element of naivete in the discussion of the
judge's role because most would agree that when faced with an
immoral result the judge often has a degree of discretion in her
29 See generally A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics
112-37 (1980); D. LUBAN, LAWYERS ANDJUSTICE 128-74 (1988); DonaganJustlfying Legal Prac-
tice In The Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAWYER 123 (D. Luban ed. 1983); Postema,
Moral Responsibility In Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980).
The lawyer whose client wishes to take action which is legal but, in the view of the
lawyer, immoral, may engage the client in discussion of his objectives and their signifi-
cance. Whatever predisposition the lawyer has with respect to participation in legal but
immoral action, it seems that such discussion is required of the moral lawyer. This obli-
gation is advocated by Professor Thomas Shaffer in his scholarly book, ON BEING A
CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981). The first three chapters deal with the morality of role,
the morality of withdrawal, and the obligation of moral conversation with the client.
30 See D. LUBAN, supra note 29 at 60-66, 145, 148; Wasserstrom, Lawyers As Profes-
sionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 12 (1975).
31 See A. GOLDMAN, supra note 29, at 34-49.
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findings of fact and application of law which will enable her to
avoid the immoral result. Sometimes, however, that option is not
available.
Let us turn now to the problem of the liability of the trustee
for self-dealing. A wealthy person transferred assets to a trustee
who was to pay the trust income to the transferor's son for his
life, and upon his death, pay over the principal to son's descen-
dants. The assets included corporate stocks, bonds, and a parcel
of undeveloped land. The trust instrument authorized the trustee
to retain the land but did not require her to do so. Unless the
trust instrument provides otherwise, unimproved land is normally
deemed to be an improper trust investment because it is not pro-
ductive of income and its market value may be volatile due in
part to the inefficiency of the market for land. The transferor
died five years later. Two years after his death the trustee decided
to sell the parcel of land because it was not appreciating in value
and it was not producing income. The decision to sell was clearly
proper. She placed it on the market for several months and re-
ceived several offers, the highest of which was $95,000. She had
an appraisal made by an expert who valued the land at $100,000.
The estimated market value at the time of the creation of the
trust was $90,000. The trustee, an investor in land, decided to
buy the land from herself as trustee for $100,000. The trustee
had no secret information about the prospects for the land. She
purchased because she believed in land as a long-term investment.
There is a rule in trust law that all transactions between the
trustee and herself individually, regardless of fairness, are
breaches of trust, and any beneficiary has an action to rescind the
transaction. This is known as the "no further inquiry" rule. The
lawyer who handled the land sale did not inform the trustee of
this rule, but such failure to inform is not available as a defense
to the breach.
Two years later, due to some new development plans near
the land, its value shot up to $150,000. The son learned of the
sale by the trustee to herself and insisted that the land be re-
turned to the trust in exchange for the $100,000 paid plus inter-
est on it.
First, there is the issue of the morality of the "no further
inquiry" rule for self-dealing, which may penalize a. trustee who
has inflicted no damage on the trust. The rule, is an implementa-
tion of the moral duty of fidelity. The trustee undertakes to serve
exclusively the interests of the beneficiaries. It is difficult for an
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individual to maintain her objectivity when her interests are in-
volved. Whenever the trustee deals with herself, psychological
forces are set in motion which are not favorable to the interests
of the trust, even though the trustee may be capable of control-
ling those forces. The legal system has determined that it is better
to prohibit all self-dealing than to allow self-dealing which can be
proved to be fair. This rule may inflict damage upon a trustee
who has not harmed the trust, but the rule is morally defensible
because of the potential for advantage at the expense of the trust
which may not always be consciously done. In addition, the in-
formed trustee is on notice of the prohibition.
Is the trustee's conduct in this instance morally improper?
She did not damage the trust. When she purchased the land it
was as likely to decline in value as to rise. She was going to sell it
in any event. There is, however, the argument that a trustee com-
mits herself not to deal with herself. The law so provides, but in
this case the trustee did not know of the rule. Nevertheless, a
trustee probably senses that any transaction in which her interest
is in conflict with that of the trust is tainted. It is hypothesized
that the decision to sell was disinterested, but when a trustee pur-
chases for herself there may be subconscious self-interest involved.
It is plausible to maintain that this conduct is a breach of the
duty of fidelity, but the matter is not clear.
Is the son as beneficiary morally entitled to enforce his claim
against the trustee? The trustee may have committed a breach of
the duty of fidelity, but the trust was not damaged. The trustee
may not be without moral fault, but the liability is punitive. It is a
close call, but my conclusion is that exercising one's legal rights
in this situation is morally justified.
Another area of trust law that presents moral issues is the
spendthrift trust. Testator dies leaving a will in which he disposes
of his estate to Bank, as trustee, whose duty is to pay the income
from the property to Testator's wife for her life, and upon her
death, to distribute the trust property outright to Testator's chil-
dren. The will also provides that the beneficial interests of the
wife and the children cannot be transferred by them and are not
subject to the claims of their creditors. The prohibition upon the
voluntary and involuntary transfer of the beneficial interests
makes this a so-called "spendthrift trust." In most states these con-
straints are valid, subject to several exceptions described below.
Once the income or principal of the trust is paid to the benefi-
ciary the creditors of the beneficiary can reach it and the benefi-
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ciary can transfer it, but the beneficiary cannot transfer the right
to future payments and creditors cannot reach such payments in
the hands of the trustee. The purpose of the spendthrift trust is
to assure the flow of benefits directly to the beneficiary.
The restraint upon voluntary transfer is not particularly objec-
tionable, but the restraint upon creditors is. The spendthrift trust
obstructs the creditor who seeks payment of his claim. It would
be much simpler for the creditor to garnish the beneficiary's in-
terest in the hands of the trustee.
In moral terms Testator is exercising his autonomy with re-
spect to property in furtherance of his perceived duty of fidelity
to his spouse and children. The acts of marriage and child-bearing
carry obligations. Testator is providing for his family and also
protecting them from their own improvidence. Autonomy and
duty to family, however, do not permit a person to do injury to
others. The impediment to creditors is such an injury. It is my
conclusion that the Testator's use of the spendthrift provision,
and the law which upholds it, are not morally defensible. In some
states where spendthrift provisions are generally valid, the claims
of children and spouses for alimony or support, as well as the
claims'of those who have provided "necessaries," have been ex-
cepted from the constraint. These exceptions evidence the moral
reservations concerning the spendthrift trust.
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act,3 2 promulgated in
1983, is a proposed change in law which reflects a change in the
values of society. Approximately one-third of the states have enact-
ed it. The Act permits parties to a premarital agreement to con-
tract with respect to: (1) their rights in the property of either or
both of them; (2) the disposition of property upon separation,
divorce, or death; (3) the modification or elimination of spousal
support; and (4) any other matter, including personal rights and
obligations, not in violation of public policy or a criminal statute.
The contract is valid regardless of consideration. The Act express-
ly validates a premarital agreement even if it is unconscionable as
long as the prospective spouse has knowledge of the other party's
property or has signed a waiver of disclosure of such property
prior to the execution of the agreement.
The Act has two protective provisions. If the agreement mod-
32 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987). The text's discussion draws on §§ 2, 3, and 6 of the Act.
For a list of the 16 states that have enacted the Act, see Table, UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREE-
MENT ACT, 9B U.LA. 25 (Supp. 1991).
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ifies or eliminates spousal. support causing one party to become
eligible for public assistance at the time of separation or marital
dissolution, a court may require the other party to provide sup-
port to avoid eligibility, notwithstanding the terms of the agree-
ment. Another provision states that the right of a child to support
may not be adversely affected by the agreement.
Until recent years marriage was largely a matter of state-im-
posed status. Premarital contracts dealing with support and the
consequences of divorce were unenforceable. Premarital contracts
dealing with property interests of the spouses upon death, such as
the surviving spouse's forced share and dower, were valid as long
as the contract complied with certain criteria of fairness. Agree-
ments dealing with support and the consequences of divorce en-
tered into at the time of separation were valid provided certain
fairness standards were met.
Marriage was considered the foundation of the moral society,
and the state imposed the rules of the relationship. Contracts
which would alter the rules were either forbidden or were re-
quired to meet a standard of fairness. The autonomy of the indi-
vidual, specifically freedom to contract, was restricted in the inter-
est of a fundamental societal good. In the case of the premarital
agreement there was also a paternalistic element in the restriction
of autonomy: the state was protecting a prospective spouse from
making an imprudent decision affecting the remote future in cir-
cumstances where pressures were likely to exist.
In the past two decades, many courts have changed the law
to allow premarital contracts dealing with the consequences of
separation and divorce, provided they meet certain criteria of
fairness. Premarital contracts dealing otherwise with support dur-
ing marriage have remained unenforceable.
The traditional approach to marriage was that of a lifetime
commitment of sharing, support, and raising of children, and the
law reflected those values. The same sense of lifetime commit-
ment and family is often lacking today among young couples.
Often both spouses have careers whose importance competes with
marital considerations. The divorce explosion has also made mar-
riage often a middle-age, or post-middle-age, event where family is
not an objective. I think it is a safe generalization that autonomy
is valued more highly today in the marital context than it was in
generations past.
It is not surprising, then, that the Uniform Premarital Agree-
ment Act has had a reasonably warm reception in the several
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years since its promulgation. Support, property disposition on
divorce and death, and other things that may come to mind, are
matters of contract without restraints of fairness. Sharing and
support may be abolished by contract. The moral duty of fidelity
has been subordinated to autonomy.
Let us now examine briefly freedom of speech under the first
amendment. Certainly this furthers the moral objective of individ-
ual iutonomy, specifically expression. Some protected expression
may, however, be immoral. An extremist group, which advocates
racism, religious hatred, and genocide, acts immorally because its
speech is an effort to harm individuals without justification. Moral
autonomy does not extend to the invasion of the moral rights of
others. A societal judgment has been made, however, that it is
better to afford protection to patently immoral speech of this
socio-political nature than to draw lines with respect to what
socio-political speech is permissible and what is not. Such line-
drawing is undesirable because it could have a chilling effect on
speech that society does not wish to inhibit, and it could lead to
the proscription of unpopular speech which should not be pro-
scribed. The first amendment protects immoral speech in order to
preserve the moral exercise of autonomy.
Some of the issues that are presented in the examples have
been treated very briefly and lend themselves to much more ex-
tensive analysis. The purpose of this Article is to introduce the
reader to the basic content of morality, the method of applied
morality, and the relevance of morality to law.
VI. Two SUBJECTS NOT DISCUSSED
(1) The moral analysis outlined in this Article assumes the
existence of certain moral duties which serve to maintain the
autonomy and dignity of the human being. Do these duties and
values have universality, or are they merely a manifestation of our
Western culture and its Judeo-Christian religious roots?
Certainly, different cultures have different moral positions. It
does seem hard to believe, however, that any culture would find
acceptable the infliction of harm without justification, the lying or
breaking of promises without justification, or the unequal treat-
ment of people who are in the same situation without justifica-
tion. This may be what is meant by "self-evident." There is, how-
ever, the matter of the reasons which justify the deviations from
these norms of conduct, which clearly vary from culture to cul-
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ture, or over the years within the same culture."3 In America we
have treated blacks and women differently from others because
race and gender were deemed to justify different treatment. This
was accepted in good conscience by intelligent and just people in
our society. It is not necessary to examine the culture of some
primitive South American tribe to establish differences in moral
outlook.
Whether or not our moral system has an element of univer-
sality, it is an humane system. We ignore it at our peril.
(2) This Article has dealt with what is called "normative eth-
ics, namely ... the basic principles, criteria, or standards by
which we are to determine what we morally ought to do, what is
morally right or wrong, and what our moral rights are." 4 This is
the objective aspect of morality.
There is also a subjective aspect to moral conduct. A person
who contributes to charity in order to improve his social standing
in the community has done good for people but it does not re-
flect moral goodness in the person. A person who learned in law
school, and believes, that when one makes a contract one always
has the options of performing or breaching and paying damages,
because no moral significance attaches to the promise, cannot be
considered in a subjective sense to be acting immorally when he
willfully breaches the contract and volunteers damages. A physi-
cian who lies to a terminally ill patient because he believes that
telling the truth will harm the patient, whereas in fact his assess-
ment was erroneous and the patient would have welcomed the
truth in order to prepare himself psychologically and arrange his
affairs, is not considered to have acted subjectively in an immoral
manner.
The moral quality of the person is an important aspect of
morality,"5 but it is beyond the scope of this Article. Our con-
cern is with the characterization of the objective conduct, not the
spirit that produced it.
CONCLUSION
Morality, the sense of "right" and "wrong," seems to be a
part of us, so it is inevitable that it plays a role in the legal reso-
lution of human conflict. The study of moral norms and their ap-
33 See S. AsCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 377-79 (1952).
34 W. FRANKENA, supra note 13, at 61.
35 See generally id. at 62-71.
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plication to situations of conflict should enable us as lawyers and
members of society to use this most civilizing quality more effec-
tively. We tend to make moral assessments without reflection; we
should do better than that.
The fact that thinking people can arrive at different moral
conclusions concerning conduct or conflict is not a reason for
dismissing morality as a method of analysis. No matter what form
of analysis is applied to human problems, informed people will
come to different conclusions. One reason for this is that the
analysis of human affairs necessarily is concerned with values.
If our understanding of law is to be informed, morality must
be considered. Legal education has been remiss in this respect. It
is my hope that this rudimentary exposition Will help to demystify
morality and its role in our legal system.

